Valence matters in voting behaviour, but how exactly? A large body of scholarly research concludes that valence adds a second important dimension to the standard policy-based electoral competition. Valence issues have the peculiar property of voters having identical preferences over them. They all prefer more to less of a given valence attribute. They prefer more to less competent politicians; they prefer more to less honest politicians. Fittingly, Groseclose (2007) argues that valence adds 'half' a dimension to the standard one-dimensional Downsian model of electoral competition.
effects on electoral performance increase as parties diverge from the mean voter's ideological position. 1 In this article, we employ an experimental technique called conjoint analysis to understand how voters make decisions when faced with multi-dimensional choices. We have designed a so-called stated preference experiment where participants are asked to choose between candidates that vary along three valence (education, income and honesty) and two ideological attributes (attitudes toward taxation and spending and the rights of same-sex couples). We have administered the experiment to 347 subjects in 2012-3, resulting in 9,352 votes over pair-wise compared candidates.
Our results indicate that education and integrity, but not income, indeed behave like valence issues where voters prefer more to less. More interestingly, policy positions and valence attributes are not separable. They interact, apparently taking the competency form. The impact of higher valence on the likelihood of voting for a candidate is conditional on such candidate's policy positions. It is higher when positions are closer to those of the respondents. Finally, when push comes to shove, policy trumps valence. Voters are ready to trade a higher valence candidate, with whom they do not share policy views, for a lower valence one with whom they share such views.
In the next section, we formalize voters' choice in a multidimensional space employing spatial voting theory, emphasizing the importance of separable and non-separable preferences and of 1 In an experimental study, Mondak and Huckfeld (2006) find that competence and integrity matter the most when participants with clear political views evaluate candidates with clear political affiliations. They matter less if signals about political affiliation are mixed or participants hold centrist views. However, without measures of participant-candidate ideological proximity, it is hard to infer whether these results support positive or negative complementarity. Recently, Galeotti and Zizzo (2014) have analysed the trade-off between competence and trustworthiness of candidates, showing a slight bias in favour of the latter. saliency of the dimensions. We then introduce the design of the experiment, explain the estimation model and discuss the main results. and spending, and each of these attributes can take any of three ordered values. The profile of a candidate can be characterized by low education, high integrity and a pro-spending position.
VOTER CHOICE OVER CANDIDATES WITH MULTIPLE ATTRIBUTES
The ideal candidate of a respondent is represented by the column vector [ ] , where is her ideal value of attribute and . In a pairwise comparison of candidates' profiles (i.e. ), let ( ) { } be the potential binary outcome of respondent over a candidate with profile . The value of 1 represents that the respondent would choose the cth profile if she got the treatment , while the value of 0 means that she would not choose such profile. Since respondents must choose one profile in each decision, ∑ ( ) for . Employing the weighted Euclidean distance of spatial voting theory (Enelow and Hinich 1984; Hinich and Munger 1997: 80) , we have therefore,
where is a symmetric positive-definite matrix of order . 2 The diagonal elements in measure the salience attached by respondent to each attribute, and the off-diagonal elements capture the interaction across attributes. If is an identity matrix, respondent attaches the same weight to 2 In case of equivalence, the respondent is indifferent between the two candidates and we assume that she flips a coin.
each attribute and preferences are separable across attributes. If the diagonal elements in take difference values, the respondent assigns more salience to some attributes in her voting decision.
For instance, she may consider a candidate's integrity more important than his income. In a bidimensional space, indifference contours take an elliptical rather than a circular shape. If the offdiagonal elements in are different from zero, preferences are nonseparable and attributes interact along the lines of the competency form discussed by Groseclose (2001 
A CONJOINT ANALYSIS VOTING EXPERIMENT
Conjoint analysis is a method that allows isolating the aspects that influence a respondent's choice in a multidimensional space. It originates from mathematical psychology (Luce and Tukey 1964) and it has been extensively employed in marketing research and economics to measure consumer preference, forecast demand and develop new products (P. E. Green and Rao 1971; P. E. Green, Krieger, and Wind 2001; Hensher, Rose, and Greene 2005; Raghavarao, Wiley, and Chitturi 2010) .
3 Take the case of two attributes, the weighted Euclidean distance (WED) is ( (Lacy 2001, 240) .
It has been applied only very recently to research questions in political science (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2012; Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014 Adams et al. 2011; Enelow and Hinich 1982; Fiorina 1981; Groseclose 2001; Londregan and Romer 1993; Stone and Simas 2010) . These factors are not particularly meaningful or useful in pairwise comparisons between generically labelled candidates. They are either context-specific or instrumental -and the latter are not valued intrinsically by voters. In light 4 Like Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2014) , we exclude party labels because the opinions participants have with regard to a given party may either be correlated with existing attributes or be proxies for omitted ones, therefore confounding our analysis of how respondents trade between policy and valence. With generic labels, the unobserved components of the choice function are less likely to be cross-correlated and more likely to have the same distribution (Hensher, Rose, and Greene 2005, 112-3) . The design of the experiment is also simplified because otherwise you would need several party labels and more tasks. The downside is that we cannot test the impact of party identification.
of the models reviewed above, we are interested in candidate-specific and character-based attributes related competence and integrity (e.g. Adams et al. 2011; Clark 2009; Clark and Leiter 2014; Funk 1996; Funk 1999; Kulisheck and Mondak 1996; McCurley and Mondak 1995; Mondak and Huckfeldt 2006; Stone and Simas 2010) . "Maintain the level of provision of social services and taxation" "Cut taxes, even at the cost of fewer social services"
Family law "Same rights to same-sex couples"
"Some rights to same-sex couples"
"No rights to same-sex couples"
Attributing directly a level of competence to a candidate would make the whole exercise pleonastic.
The choice between a competent candidate and an incompetent one is banal. We employ instead education and income, which are considered proxies for competence in several recent models (Caselli and Morelli 2004; Galasso and Nannicini 2011; Messner and Polborn 2004) . A higher educational attainment is plausibly related to greater perceived competence as it indicates, or even determines, higher cognitive and problem solving skills in policy making. The link between income and competence, or valence more generally, may instead raise a few eyebrows. Yet, citizen-candidate models, which seek to fully endogenize candidacies by removing the distinction between the electorate and the political class and are particularly concerned with the qualities of politicians (Dewan and Shepsle 2011) , unabashedly assign to income a strong connotation of valence as "a measure of market success and ability" (Galasso and Nannicini 2011, 79) . For Caselli and Morelli (2004, 775) , "voters use [candidates'] market incomes as a signal of their competence" in office. On the other hand, income may signal other features, such as class membership, and therefore display no valence behaviour. Our experiment will subject these assertions to testing.
The education attribute includes three levels of attainment: junior high school diploma, high school diploma and university degree. In Italy, they are called licenza media, diploma superiore and laurea. The levels of income are low, medium and high. Low income is specified as below €900 a month, which is approximately the second decile of the 2009 income distribution in Italy. High income is specified as above €3000 a month, approximately the ninety-fifth percentile.
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As far as the third valence attribute is concerned, it is introduced as additional information, thus avoiding more laden terms such as integrity. A candidate may have been convicted of corruption, be under investigation for corruption or have a clean sheet -corruption being the most common officerelated crime a politician is likely to be charged with.
Candidates also differentiate along policy positions which are derived from well-established cleavages: the liberal-interventionist economic divide and liberal-conservative social one (e.g. Benoit and Laver 2006: 160; Kitschelt 1994) . To capture the former, we established that candidates may want to increase the provision of social services, even at the cost of more taxation, to maintain the current levels, or to cut taxes, even at the cost of fewer social services. These are frequently the top priorities of government for Italian public opinion (European Commission 2010: 24) . For the latter, candidates may want to grant no family-related rights to same-sex couples, to grant these couples some rights or even the same rights as traditional families. This is currently the most debated issue that captures the liberal-conservative social divide in Italy. Others, such as abortion and euthanasia, are less prominent. Table 2 illustrates an example of a choice task. Note that it does not offer the possibility of abstention. Although including this option would better reflect the situation in which voters find themselves, we are not interested in participation in this context. Our objective is to assess the impact of candidates' attributes on voters' choice. A no vote alternative is a hindrance for our analysis because the only information that can be derived from abstention is that the respondent would prefer not to choose. We do not obtain any information of why this is so. As Hensher, Rose and Greene (2005: 176) argue, 'by forcing decision makers to make a choice, we oblige decision makers to trade off the attribute levels of the available alternatives and thus obtain information on the relationships that exist between the varying attribute levels and choice'.
Experimental Design Considerations
Which candidate profiles should be included in the conjoint analysis and how should be paired? A full factorial design is one in which all possible treatment combinations (i.e. profiles) are enumerated (Hensher, Rose, and Greene 2005: 109 Such a design is clearly unfeasible. We will therefore use only a fraction of these combinations -a so-called fractional factorial design.
The minimum number of profiles of a fractional factorial design is determined by the degrees of Additionally, a statistically efficient fractional factorial design must be orthogonal, where columns display zero correlation (Hensher, Rose, and Greene 2005: 115) . In other words, the levels that an attribute takes across all choice tasks should be statistically independent from the levels other attributes take. Orthogonality may demand a number of combinations that exceeds the minimum requirement imposed by the degrees of freedom (in our case, nineteen for a non-linear model).
However, for unlabelled designs, only within-alternative orthogonality needs to be maintained (Hensher, Rose, and Greene 2005: 152) . In other words, the education attribute of candidate A across all the choice tasks does not need to be orthogonal to the education attribute of candidate B.
A last appreciable feature is that the design should be balanced. Each level of any given attribute should appear the same number of times.
Since we require only within-alternative orthogonality, we generated a main-effects orthogonal design for five attributes and three levels for attribute, setting at twenty-seven the minimum number of cases (rows). The design is balanced because each level of each attribute appears nine times. We have assigned attributes to the columns of the design in order to ensure statistically efficient estimations of the main effects and of the interactions between education and the two policy dimensions (for the details on the procedure see Hensher, Rose, and Greene 2005: 127-150 ). Seven out of the possible ten two-way interactions between attributes display zero correlation with the main effects. Several interactive terms are also uncorrelated with each other. In practise, this means that we can efficiently estimate the marginal effects of all the ten pairwise interactions among the five attributes. 6 We have now twenty-seven orthogonal profiles of candidate A. We have then randomized the sequence of these profiles and assigned them to candidate B, making sure that the randomized combination does not match the original. This procedure ensures within-alternative orthogonality (Hensher, Rose, and Greene 2005: 152) .
The core of the experiment consists in twenty-seven choice tasks (i.e. ) where respondents are requested to choose between two candidates' profiles. The order of the attributes, as it appears in Table 2 , does not change for each respondent in order to ease the cognitive burden, but the 6 The fractional factorial and orthogonal design is the most widely used in the conjoint analysis literature. In introducing this method to political science, Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2014) recently proposed a randomized variant of conjoint analysis that does not require any assumption about choice probabilities. Our design imposes no restrictions to the pairwise interactions and to five of the six three-way interactions. Of the interaction between income, integrity and family law, only the following profiles are observed: middle income, corrupt and some rights; high income, investigated and some rights; high income, corrupt, no rights.
sequence of tasks is randomized across respondents in order to minimise primacy and recency effects.
The only applications of conjoint analysis in political science is in the field of public opinion (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2012; Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014 
where is the value of attribute for candidate c, with the interactions between education ( ) and the two policy dimensions ( ), is the Hadamard product of row vectors of betas and socio-demographic and political characteristics 7 of the respondent , while is the column vector of attributes of candidates. Respondent characteristics must interact with candidate attributes because they do not display within-group variance, i.e. they do not vary across profiles.
VALENCE, IDEOLOGY AND VOTING
The results of the estimation are reported in the Appendix (Table A) . In this section, we first assess whether the attributes we selected behave as expected. Figure 1a displays on the vertical axis the 7 As socio-demographic traits, we include gender, age, nationality, working status and high school education; as political traits, interest in politics, left-right self-placement, and saliency attached to attributes. Lastly, we include an indicator variable for respondents participating in 2013.
8 Marginal effect plots are produced following Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006) and the STATA code available at https://files.nyu.edu/mrg217/public/interaction.html#code. These effects are bounded between -0.5 and 0.5 because we set the non-varying attributes at the baseline levels. Had we set them at different levels, the effects would have been confounded by the interactions between marginal effect on the probability that respondents vote for a candidate with a high school diploma, compared to one with a junior high school diploma, at different levels of interest in politics declared by the respondents. The dots indicate the mean predicted probabilities and the lines the 95% confidence intervals. The bottom right panel is a histogram of respondents' traits.
respondent characteristics and such attributes. The asymmetric confidence intervals in Figure 3 and
Figures A6 to A9 in the online appendix result from the interactions among profile attribute levels.
FIGURE 1a Marginal effects of candidate attributes at different levels of respondents' interest in politics
Note: Non-varying attributes are set at their baseline values (junior high school diploma, low income, clean, more taxation and spending, same rights to same sex-couples) 
FIGURE 1c Marginal effects of candidate attributes at different levels of respondents' saliency attached to attribute
Note: Non-varying attributes are set at their baseline values (junior high school diploma, low income, clean, more taxation and spending, same rights to same sex-couples) (2014) where middle-income matters, slightly, to win contests but high-income candidates are rated lower.
Far from being an indicator of ability, or even competence in office (cf. Caselli and Morelli 2004, 775; Galasso and Nannicini 2011, 79) , high income is seen quite suspiciously by our respondents.
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The last, somewhat obvious, result is that the valence behavior of the integrity attribute is beyond doubt. For any respondent trait, a clean candidate is significantly more likely to be preferred over a corrupt one. Even nuances are quite minor. Respondents, which are either strongly right-leaning or display no interest in politics, 12 are indifferent between candidates that are clean and those that are under investigation, but these subjects make up only 9.5 percent of the respondent pool.
Contrast this with the opinions of candidates on spending and taxation. we move on to analyze how participants trade-off between these attributes.
Evidence of a Competency Form: Interaction among Education and Policy Attributes
Is it plausible to assume that valence is a separable component that is simply added to a standard policy-based dimension as most formal models of electoral competition do? Or do valence and policy attribute interact, perhaps taking what Groseclose (2001) For instance, the top three panels display the marginal effects on the probability that a typical respondent votes for a candidate with a high school diploma, compared to one with a junior high school diploma, across the nine combinations of policy profiles. In this case, higher education does not have much of an effect. 13 Our typical respondent is an Italian female full-time student with a fair interest in politics and left-of-center views. She is twenty-one years old, comes from a lyceum and attaches high saliency to the integrity and spending dimensions, fair saliency to education and couples' rights, and some importance to income.
FIGURE 2 Competency form: the interaction between education and policy positions
Note: Non-varying attributes are set at their baseline values (low income, clean) Consider now the left panels in the second and third rows of Figure 2 . Candidates, who support spending and at least some rights for same-sex couples, are between 20 and 23.4 percentage points more likely to be chosen if they have a university degree, rather than a high school diploma. These figures increase to 26.4 and 42.6 points respectively when university education is compared to a junior high school diploma. Conversely, if a candidate opposes the recognition of rights to same-sex couples, there is no level of education that is going to make him more palatable. This policy is strongly opposed by our typical respondent. Hence, the marginal gains from higher education vanish when policy distance increases -the key trait of Groseclose's (2001) competency form.
As the right panel in the second row of Figure 2 illustrates, higher education can even become a liability. A university educated candidate is 9.5 percentage points less likely to be chosen than a candidate with a high school diploma if, in addition to opposing rights for same-sex couples, he supports spending cuts as well (the estimate varies between 31 and 0.04 points). These two positions are strongly disliked by our typical respondent 14 and higher competence is actually perceived as worrisome in this case.
For intermediate profiles, our typical respondent trades between candidate attributes depending on their levels. Consider a candidate supporting full recognition of rights (left column of Figure A4 ). If he opposes spending, higher education does not increase his chances of being selected. If he supports cuts, and he is poorly educated, he is between 30.9 and 35.4 percentage points less likely to be chosen than a pro-spending or pro-status quo candidate.
Take now a candidate supporting partial recognition. In case of a status-quo position on spending, a university education gives a candidate a 10.9 percentage point increase in the likelihood of being preferred compared to a high school diploma (centre panel in Figure 2 ). In case of a pro-cuts position, a university education gives a 40.9 percentage point increase compared to a junior high school diploma (right panel in the third row).
In other words, the preferences of our typical respondents are finely balanced with intermediate profiles. If a candidate is for partial recognition but has only a junior high school diploma, a prostatus quo fiscal attitude makes him 35.3 percentage points more likely to be chosen than a spendthrift one (top row of Figure A4 ). Poor education makes our respondents wary of profligacy.
But this does not extend necessarily to rights issues. If a candidate is pro-spending but poorly educated, a full-recognition stance makes him still 15.5 percentage points more likely to be chosen than a partial-recognition position (top row of Figure A5 ).
The trade-offs can indeed get quite complicated to understand in these intermediate profiles.
Nevertheless, what is important to take away from this section are the significant interactions between valence and policy attributes as envisaged by Groseclose's (2001) competency form. This emerges more clearly on the dimension of same-sex couple rights. An F-test for the joint significance of the interaction terms rejects the null hypothesis that the effects of university education are identical across attribute levels (p-value ≈ 0.003). Moreover, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected when comparing candidates that support full and partial recognition (p-value ≈ 0.38), while it is easily rejected when comparing candidates that support full and no recognition (pvalue ≈ 0.005). These results appear to indicate positive complementarity, in line with the findings of J. Green and Hobolt (2008) and Buttice and Stone (2012) . On the spending dimension, since respondents hold a moderate position, this dynamics does not emerge as clearly.
However, which attributes ultimately prevail when respondents are confronted with awkward choices? We move to this question in the next section where we finally pull in integrity -the archetypal valence attribute.
Policy Trumping Valence in Awkward Choices
Candidates with dubious traits frequently run at the elections, and win. In citizen-candidates models, this outcome results from an oversupply of low-quality candidates due to limited electoral competition or a failure to coordinate by high-quality citizens (e.g. Caselli and Morelli 2004; Myerson 1993 Policy clearly trumps valence in these awkward choices. Even in the most difficult situation of deciding between a corrupt candidate that shares her policy views and a clean one that does not, our typical respondent is between 2.9 and 4.9 percentage points more likely to prefer the corrupt over the honest (despite the fact that such respondent assigns to integrity the highest average saliency, compared to the other four attributes). These figures increase to 48.7 and 56.2 points respectively if the candidate is only under investigation.
Better education is even more emphatically disregarded. Respondents are between 62.3 and 82.9
percentage points more likely to prefer less educated candidates with ideal policy views than better educated ones with disliked policy positions.
These results hold even when taking left, center or (more weakly) right-wing respondents, with their political interest and saliency traits at the mode or mean value of their subsets (see Figures A7 to A9
in the online appendix). In awkward choices, centrist voters trump valence for policy as well (cf.
Galasso and Nannicini 2011).
FIGURE 3 Awkward choices
Note: Respondent with mean or modal traits, all candidates with middle income. 
CONCLUSION
Valence comes out somewhat tarnished from this exercise. To most scholars, it is not surprising that income is far from being perceived as an indicator of valence. We suspect that this is unrelated to the characteristics of our respondent pool, so more careful thought is required. Because high income is unlikely to be rewarded electorally (and it could be even a liability), the allocation of higher income candidates to marginal seats found by Galasso and Nannicini (2011) show that the effect of university education increases as candidates' and respondents' policy opinions converge. Education may even be a liability for profiles that combine particularly disliked policy positions. On the spending dimension however, our respondents take a moderate position and perhaps there is not enough ideological dispersion to allow positive or negative complementary to materialize.
Further, integrity, the archetypal valence attribute, may be ignored. Our typical respondent prefers a corrupt, but socially and economically progressive, candidate to a clean, but conservative, one. In other words, policy trumps valence in awkward situations and this apply across all types of respondents, regardless of their political traits. Integrity, being assigned the highest mean saliency across the five attributes by most respondents, is disregarded in awkward settings.
This is not to say that, at the margin, a valence advantage is irrelevant. It may shape both the incentives of citizens to enter the electoral competition as well as the positioning of politicians in the policy-valence space. However, valence could indeed be relegated to the backstage in countries like Italy which displays comparatively high levels of public dissensus on social and economic values and an appreciable association between partisan attachment and these values (see Bartels 2013, 50) . Polarization could therefore be a fertile breeding ground for low valence politicians. In these settings, the selection of party candidates through primaries may enhance valence-based competition at the expense of policy-based competition, while selection by party elites may produce the opposite.
In conclusion, even though the similarity of some findings with the candidate conjoint experiment of Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto (2014) is of some comfort, these results need corroboration beyond the confined settings of an experiment. This is a worthy objective of future research. 
APPENDIX

